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INTRODUCTION

The discretionary asylum provision of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) generally provides that the Attorney General may
grant asylum to refugees.' The INA defines refugees as persons unable to return to their country because of a "well-founded fear of
persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a
particular social group or political opinion."'2 From this definition of
refugee comes the "well-founded fear of persecution" standard applicable to section 208 asylum requests.3 The "clear probability of persecution" standard applies to a related INA remedy, section 243(h)
1. Immigration & Nationality Act (INA), Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102, 105 (1980)
(codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a) (1985)) reads: "[T]he alien may be granted asylum in the discretion of the Attorney General if the Attorney General determines that such alien is a refugee
within the meaning of section 1101(a)(42)(A) of this title."
2. Id. § 201(a)(42), at 102 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A) (1985)).
3. Id. Cf. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, 19 U.S.T. 6259,
T.I.A.S. No. 6577, 189 U.N.T.S. 150 [hereinafter Convention]; Protocol Relating to the Status
of Refugees, opened for signature Jan. 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 6224, T.I.A.S. No. 0577, 606
U.N.T.S. 267 [hereinafter Protocol]. Congress borrowed the well-founded fear language from
both the Convention and Protocol.
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withholding of deportation." Often, immigration judges evaluate section 243(h) withholding of deportation requests and section 208 asylum requests simultaneously.' This procedure has spawned confusion
as to the correct evidentiary standard, and two different approaches
have evolved.'
The one-standard approach evaluates asylum and withholding of
deportation under the same burden of proof. 7 This approach equates
the section 208 well-founded fear standard with the section 243(h)
clear probability of persecution standard.' The two-standard approach evaluates withholding of deportation requests under a clear
probability of persecution standard, and evaluates asylum requests
under a more lenient well-founded fear standard.9 This note will discuss the development of the asylum concept to determine whether
Congress intended a one-standard or a two-standard approach. The
note also examines statutory interpretations and proposes solutions
consistent with the two-standard approach.

II.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE ASYLUM CONCEPT

A.

The Origins of Asylum

The modern history of immigration law began with the Immigration Act of 1917.10 Before passage of this Act, immigrants to the
United States faced few obstacles.1 1 The Act of 1917 excluded certain
classes of persons including idiots, imbeciles, diseased persons, defectives, criminals, polygamists, anarchists, and prostitutes."2 In addition to these qualitative restrictions, the 1917 Act required proof of
4. INA, Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102, 107 (1980) (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h)
(1985)). The statutory language does not provide the clear probability standard. Id. The courts
have inferred the standard. See INS v. Stevic, 104 S. Ct. 2489 (1984) (Court held that the clear
probability standard applied to § 243(h) claims).
5. 8 C.F.R. § 208.3(2)(b) (1985). The Code of Federal Regulations requires immigration
judges to consider § 208 asylum requests filed after deportation proceedings have commenced
as simultaneous requests for § 243(h) withholding of deportation. Id.
6. See Matter of Acosta, No. 2986, slip op. at 23 (B.I.A. Mar. 1, 1985) (provides a good
summary of both approaches).
7. See, e.g., Sankar v. INS, 757 F.2d 532, 533 (9th Cir. 1985) (explicitly reaffirms the cited
proposition).
8. Id.
9. See, e.g., Sagermark v. INS, 767 F.2d 645 (1985) (discusses the two-standard
approach).
10. Immigration Act of 1917, Pub. L. No. 64-301, 39 Stat. 874 (1917).
11. CONG. RESEARCH SERV. OF THE LIBRARY OF CONG., 96TH CONG., 2D SEss., REVIEW OF
UNITED STATES REFUGEE RESETTLEMENT PROGRAMS AND POLICIES (Comm. Print 1980) [hereinafter cited as REPORT ON REFUGEES].

12.

Immigration Act of 1917, Pub. L. No. 64-301, ch. 29, §§ 2-3, 39 Stat. 874, 875-76

(1917).
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literacy."3 Subsequently, the Immigration Act of 19241' imposed numerical immigration.' 6 However, Congress did not pass highly selective immigration legislation until 1948.
The Displaced Persons Act of 194816 granted sanctuary to forced
laborers from Axis countries. 17 The statute required aliens to prove
they were victims of persecution by the Nazi government.' 8 The 1948
Act did not grant widespread relief on a permanent basis, but instead
adopted an ad hoc approach to the refugee problem.
Although containing no specific provision for refugee admission,
passage of the INA in 195219 marked the first step in the evolution of
an asylum provision. Section 243(h) of the INA authorized the Attorney General to withold the deportation of any alien who, in his opinion, would be subject to physical persecution. 0 As its language indicated, section 243(h) granted the Attorney General unbridled
discretion.2 '
Another section of the INA granted the Attorney General considerable discretion. Section 212(d)(5) granted the Attorney General
power to parole aliens for emergent interests, or for reasons deemed
strictly in the public interest.2 2 At the time of enactment, Congress
13. Id. § 3, at 877. The Act only required proof of literacy in the immigrant's choice of
language. Id. Also, the Act exempted religious refugees and political offenders from the literacy
test. Id.
14. Immigration Act of 1924, Pub. L. No. 68-139, 43 Stat. 153 (1924).
15. Id. at 159. See also Anker & Posner, The Forty Year Crisis: A Legislative History of
the Refugee Act of 1980, 19 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 9, 14 n.18 (1981) (the article explains how the
Act utilized a formula based on national origin to maintain existing proportions of different
nationalities in the population; the article also provides an excellent discussion of the early
immigration legislation).
16. Displaced Persons Act (DPA), Pub. L. No. 80-774, 62 Stat. 1009 (1948). Executive
pressure prompted Congress to pass the Act. See S. REP. No. 950, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 56-57,
reprinted in 1948 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 2028, 2035 [hereinafter S. REP. No. 950];
H.R. REP. No. 1854, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1948) (for a discussion of how the White House
pressured Congress) [hereinafter H.R. REP. No. 1854].
17. DPA, Pub. L. No. 80-774, ch. 647, § 2(d), 62 Stat. 1009, 1010 (1948). The Act contained cut-off dates which prevented 90 percent of displaced Jews in Germany, Austria, and
Italy from obtaining visas. S. REP. No. 950, supra note 16; H.R. REP. No. 1854, supra note 16.
18. DPA, Pub. L. No. 80-774, ch. 647, § 2(c), 62 Stat. 1009, 1010 (1948).
19. Immigration & Nationality Act (INA), Pub. L. No. 82-414, 66 Stat. 163 (1952). The
Act set the annual quota for any area at one-sixth of one percent of the number of inhabitants
in the continental United States in 1920 whose ancestry or national origin was attributable to
that quota area. Id. at 175. See H.R. REP. No. 608, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979) (for a discussion
of the Refugee Act of 1980) [hereinafter cited as H.R. RaP. No. 608].
20. INA, Pub. L. No. 82-414, ch. 477, § 243(h), 66 Stat. 163, 214 (1952). The Attorney
General withheld deportation as long as he deemed it necessary in order for the alien to avoid
persecution. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id. § 212(d)(5), at 188. See generally Kap, Refugees Under United States Immigration Law, 24 CLaV. ST. L. REV. 528 (1975) (for an excellent discussion concerning the history of
the parole authority).
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intended the Attorney General to use the parole authority for the
temporary admission of otherwise inadmissible individuals.2 However, following the Soviet invasion of Hungary in October 1956, President Eisenhower directed the Attorney General to exercise his section 212(d)(5) parole authority and admit en masse approximately
15,000 Hungarian refugees.24 This parole authority allowed the refugees to enter, but did not provide for adjustment of their status. 25
In 1960 Congress passed the Fair Share Refugee Act which admitted refugees under the parole authority and provided for status adjustment after two years.2 6 The Fair Share Refugee Act helped eliminate the remaining refugee camps in Europe. 7 Some members of
Congress criticized this Act because, like the Displaced Persons Act,
it failed to integrate refugee admission procedures into the permanent immigration law.28
Congress enacted the first permanent refugee admission procedure in the 1965 amendments to the INA.2 9 However, the Attorney
General continued to administer refugee admission policy on a covertly ad hoc basis.3 0 Not until the Refugee Act of 1980 (1980 Act) 1
23. H.R. REP. No. 608, supra note 19, at 3.
24. See Hearings on H.R. 7700 Before the Subcomm. on Immigration & Naturalization
of the House Comm. on the Judiciary,90th Cong., 1st Sess. 485 (1964) (a total of 38,000 Hungarian refugees eventually resettled in the United States) [hereinafter cited as H.R. 7700
Hearings].
25. See STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 96TH CONG., 1ST SESS., A REPORT UPON
THE FORMATION OF THE SELECT COMMISSION ON IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE POLICY: U.S. IMMIGRA-

1952-1979, at 18 (Comm. Print 1979) (legislation permitting the Hungarian parolees to adjust to permanent resident status was enacted in July 1958) [hereinafter
cited as SENATE COMM. REPORT].
26. Fair Share Refugee Act, Pub. L. No. 86-648, 74 Stat. 504 (1960).
27. SENATE COMM. REPORT, supra note 25, at 22.
28. See 106 CONG. REC. 14,387 (daily ed. June 25, 1960) (comments made by members of
the House of Representatives).
29. The Immigration & Nationality Act Amendments of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-236, 79
Stat. 911 (1965). The Act contained a provision granting conditional entry to refugees independent of the parole authority. Id. § 203(a)(7), at 913. To qualify for conditional entry under §
203(a)(7), the alien had to prove under (A)(1) that, because of persecution or fear of persecution on account of race, religion, or political opinion, he had fled from a communist or communist dominated country, or the Middle East, and (2) the alien was unable or unwilling to return
to his country on account of race, religion, or political opinion, and (3) he was not a national of
the United States or (B) that the alien was a person uprooted by catastrophic national calamity
as defined by the President. Id. Congress expressed an intent to limit the parole authority to its
original use for emergent, individual, and isolated situations. S. REP. No. 748, 89th Cong., 1st
Sess. 3335 (1965). See also H.R. REP. No. 608, supra note 19, at 4 (discusses parole authority);
Anker & Posner, supra note 15, at 17. Cf. 111 CONG. REC. 24,237 (daily ed. Sept. 17, 1965)
(Senator Thurmond stated that the parole authority should still be utilized for large groups of
immigrants when in the public interest).
30. H.R. REP. No. 608, supra note 19, at 2.
31. Refugee Act (RA), Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102 (1980) (codified at 8 U.S.C. §
1101(a)(42)(A) (1985)).
TION LAW AND POLICY:
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did Congress enact a statutory asylum provision with formalized
procedures.32
B.

The Asylum Provision

1. The Refugee Act of 1980
The 1980 Act 8" adopted a new definition for the term "refugee"
which conformed to the definition used in the United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (Convention)3 4 and the
Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees (Protocol).3 5 The 1980
Act defines a refugee as any person outside his country "who is unable or unwilling to return to . . .that country because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion,
nationality, membership in a particular social group or political opinion."3 6 This definition removed the geographical and ideological re1
strictions applicable to conditional entrant refugees under the INA.
More importantly, section 208 of the Act, providing for statutory asylum, incorporated the new definition of refugee."'
Before the 1980 Act, asylum procedures were governed by regulations promulgated under the authority of INA section 103.1' Section
103 granted the Attorney General power to administer and enforce
laws relating to immigration.'0 Under the 1979 Code of Federal Regulations, the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) district director exercised complete discretion when granting asylum"1 and the
regulation provided no formal guidelines."2
Although still discretionary, section 208 of the 1980 Act provided
guidelines. Under this section, an alien becomes eligible for a discre32. H.R. REP. No. 608, supra note 19, at 17.
33. RA, Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102 (1980).
34. Convention, supra note 3 (The United States signed the Convention itself). See INS
v. Stevic, 104 S.Ct. 2489, 2494 n.9 (1984).
35. Protocol, supra note 3. See generally Frank, Effect of the 1967 United Nations Protocol on the Status of Refugees in the United States, 11 INT'L LAW. 291 (1977) (article on the
impact of the Protocol prior to the passage of the Refugee Act of 1980).
36. RA, Pub. L. No. 96-212, § 201(a)(42), 94 Stat. 102, 102 (1980) (codified at 8 U.S.C. §
1101(a)(42)(A) (1985)).
37. See Immigration & Nationality Act Amendments of 1964, Pub. L. No. 89-239, §
203(a)(7), 79 Stat. 911, 913 (1965) (entry requirements under § 203(a)(7) cited supra note 29).
See generally Anker & Posner, supra note 15, at 18 (discusses § 203(a)(7) entry requirements).
38. RA, Pub. L. No. 96-212, § 208(a), 94 Stat. 102, 105 (1980) (codified at 8 U.S.C. §
1158(a) (1985)).
39. INA, Pub. L. No. 82-414, § 103(a), 66 Stat. 103, 173 (1952).
40. Id.
41. 8 C.F.R. § 108 (1979). This section lingered in the Justice Department's regulations
until its repeal on January 1, 1982. Id. From the time Congress enacted § 208 of the INA until
January 1, 1982, aliens could choose between the old and new forms of asylum. Id.
42. Id.
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tionary grant of asylum after establishing refugee status.4 s Congress
enacted the asylum provision to ensure a fair and workable asylum
policy consistent with obligations under international law.4
2.

The Burden of Proof

Regulations promulgated under the asylum provision assign the
burden of proof to the asylum applicant. 4 5 To become eligible for discretionary asylum, the applicant must establish his unwillingness to
return to his native country because of persecution on account of
rate, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group or
political opinion."" The Attorney General, through the INS, determines whether the asylum applicant has met his burden of proof.
The Justice Department, however, placed some constraints on the
Attorney General's discretion. Under these constraints, he must deny
asylum if the alien: (1) does not qualify as a refugee, (2) has firmly
resettled in a foreign country, (3) has participated in the persecution
of any person on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in
a particular group or political opinion, (4) has been convicted of a
particularly dangerous crime, or (5) constitutes a danger to United
States security.' 7 If the INS district director denies the asylum request for an alien located outside the United States, the director
places the alien under exclusion proceedings.'8 If the director denies
the asylum request for an alien in the United States, the district director may either grant voluntary departure or commence deportation proceedings. 9
The district director may also terminate asylum status if circumstances change in the asylee's native country.5 0 The director must review annually the individual's eligibility for asylum. 51 If a third nation extends the asylee a resettlement offer, then the director may
43. RA, Pub. L. No. 96-212, § 208(a), 94 Stat. 102, 105 (1980).
44. H.R. REP. No. 608, supra note 19, at 17.
45. 8 C.F.R. §§ 208.2, 208.5 (1986).
46. Id. § 208.5. The applicant must submit the following forms: (1) 1-589, "Request for
Asylum Within the United States"; (2) G-325A, biographical information; and (3) FD-258, fingerprint chart. Id. § 208.2. The alien files the application with the appropriate INS district
director before the applicant enters the United States or after the applicant has already entered, provided exclusion or deportation hearings have not been instituted. Id. § 208.3. After
institution of exclusion or deportation hearings, the applicant should file the asylum claim with
the docket clerk of the immigration court. Id. The court also considers these asylum requests as
§ 243(h) withholding of deportation requests. Id.
47. Id. § 208.8(f).
48. Id. § 208.10(f).
49. Id. § 208.16.
50. Id. § 208.15(a).

51. Id. § 208.8(e)(1).
https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil/vol2/iss2/4
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terminate asylum provided the third nation would not persecute the
asylee.52
C.

Asylum Distinguished from Withholding of Deportation

The 1980 Act amended the INA to include statutory asylum
under section 208.53 The INA already provided for withholding of deportation under section 243(h).5 4 The INS must withhold deportation
once an alien meets the section 243(h) requirements. Under section
208, the INS has discretion to grant asylum. 5 Despite these differences, under the Code of Federal Regulations, if an alien applies for
asylum after deportation proceedings have begun, the immigration
judge also must consider the asylum request as a request for withholding of deportation."" However, Congress specifically intended
that the United States offer asylum procedures separate from withholding of deportation relief.5" The statutory language neither provides any cross-references between sections 208 and 243(h) nor requires immigration judges to consider both sections simultaneously. 58
Until 1984 the alien's burden of proof for asylum and withholding of
deportation remained uncertain.5
In 1984 the Supreme Court distinguished the two provisions and
decided the burden of proof under section 243(h). In INS v. Stevic,60
a Yugoslavian national filed for section 243(h) withholding of deportation." At no time did the respondent-alien file for asylum under
52. Id. § 208.8(f)(2).
53. RA, Pub. L. No. 96-212, § 208(a), 94 Stat. 102, 105 (1980).
54. INA, Pub. L. No. 82-414, § 243(h), 66 Stat. 163, 214 (1952). The 1965 amendments
removed the words "physical persecution" and substituted the words "persecution on account
of race, religion, or political opinion." Pub. L. No. 89-236, § 11(e), 79 Stat. 911, 918 (1965).
Subsequently, Congress further amended § 243(h) in the Refugee Act of 1980. Pub. L. No. 96212, § 203(e), 94 Stat. 102, 107 (1980) (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h) (1985)). The section now
states that "the Attorney General shall not deport or return any alien to a country if the Attor-

ney General determines that such alien's life or freedom would be threatened in such country
on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political
opinion." Id.
55. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1158(a), 1253(h) (1986). Note that before the Refugee Act of 1980, §
243(h) was discretionary. INA, Pub. L. No. 82-414, § 243(h), 66 Stat. 214 (1952), as amended
Pub. L. No. 89-236, § 11(e), 79 Stat. 918 (1965).
56. 8 C.F.R. § 208.3(b) (1986).
57. Hearings on H.R. 2816 Before the Subcomm. on Immigration, Refugees & International Law of the Comm. of the Judiciary, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 24-26 (1979). When formulating the Refugee Act of 1980, Congress could have done away with § 243(h). Instead, Congress
kept it and added § 208 asylum. Pub. L. No. 96-212, § 208(a), 94 Stat. 102, 105 (1980).
58. Justice Department regulations may cause immigration judges to evaluate § 243(h)
and § 208 claims simultaneously. See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
59. See, e.g., Zavala-Bonilla v. INS, 730 F.2d 562, 564 n.1 (9th Cir. 1984).
60. 104 S. Ct. 2489 (1984).
61. Stevic v. Sava, 678 F.2d 401, 403 (1982).
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section 208.62 The respondent argued that after the 1980 Act, 3 he no
longer had the burden of showing a clear probability of persecution."
Instead, the respondent asserted he could avoid section 243(h) deportation by demonstrating a well-founded fear of persecution. 5
The Court stated that, unlike section 208 asylum, section 243(h)
withholding of deportation did not refer to the well-founded fear language contained in the 1980 Act. 6 Rather, an alien must establish a7
clear probability of persecution to avoid section 243(h) deportation.
The Stevic Court explicitly stated that it did not decide the meaning
of well-founded fear of persecution applicable to requests for discretionary asylum. 6 In dicta, however, the Court assumed the wellfounded fear standard was more generous than the clear probability
standard.6 The INS has implicitly rejected the Court's view by
adopting a one-standard approach.
III.
A.

STATUTORY INTERPRETATIONS

The One-Standard Approach

1. The Immigration and Naturalization Service
The INS has decided the meaning of well-founded fear in a number of cases before the Board of Immigration Appeals (Board). In
Matter of Lam, 70 the respondent-alien appealed an immigration
judge's order denying his request for asylum, but granting withholding of deportation. 71 Lam held that when an alien satisfies the burden of proof for withholding of deportation, he also establishes a
72
well-founded fear of persecution for asylum purposes.
The Board's holding did not preclude the possibility of evaluating
the two provisions under different standards. If an alien meets the
section 243(h) clear probability standard, then he also satisfies the
62. Id. at 402-04.
63. RA, Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102 (1980).
64. Stevic, 104 S. Ct. at 2492.
65. Id. at 2497. See generally Verkuil, A Study of Immigration Procedures, 31 UCLA L.
REV. 1141 (1984) (for an overview of general immigration procedure).
66. Stevic, 104 S. Ct. at 2497-98.
67. Id. at 2492. See Note, The Right to Asylum Under United States Immigration Law,
33 U. FLA. L. REV. 539 (1981) (for a discussion of the § 243(h) conflict before Stevic resolved the
issue).
68. Stevic, 104 S. Ct. at 2501. See generally Schuck, The Transformation of Immigration
Law, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1984) (emphasizes the importance of resolving immigration and particularly asylum issues).
69. Stevic, 104 S. Ct. at 2498.
70. 18 I & N Dec. 15 (B.I.A. 1981).
71. Id. at 16, 17.
72. Id. at 18. Note that although the alien satisfied the burden of proof for asylum, the
Board in its discretion denied it. Id.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil/vol2/iss2/4

8

Lee: The Refugee's
of Proof for
Why
Standards Are B
1986]
FORTwo
ASYLUM
STANDARDS
OFAsylum:
PROOF
TWOBurden

less stringent section 208 well-founded fear of persecution standard.
While the Board never stated whether it evaluated the section 208
and 243(h) requests under different or identical standards, it nevertheless carefully distinguished the two sections. 7" Lam left the asylum burden of proof issue open because the Board had just begun to
relationship between withholding of deportadetermine the proper
74
tion and asylum.
One year later, however, the Board hinted that it would evaluate
section 208 and 243(h) claims under the same standard. In Matter of
Salim,7 5 the alien appealed the immigration judge's decision denying
his request for discretionary asylum and withholding of deportation.7 8 The Board denied the asylum request and sustained the section 243(h) request.7 7 In dicta, Salim stated that once an alien establishes the requisite probability of persecution for section 243(h), this
conclusion binds the persecution issue for section 208 asylum.78
Though not definitively precluding a two-standard approach, the
statement implies that immigration judges should evaluate section
208 requests under section 243(h) burden of proof standards.
The Board explicitly reached this conclusion three years later. In
Matter of Acosta,"' the immigration judge denied an alien's request
for section 208 asylum and section 243(h) withholding of deportation. 0 The Board affirmed the immigration judge's ruling, carefully
analyzing the section 208 burden of proof issue.81 Acosta stated that,
as a practical matter, the burden of proof under the well-founded
fear standard converged with the burden of proof under the clear
82
probability of persecution standard.
The practical matter Acosta alluded to arises when immigration
73. Id. The Board pointed out that unlike asylum, withholding of deportation constituted
a country-specific remedy. Id. Thus, if the INS can deport the alien to any other country under
§ 243(h), then the INS will deport the alien whether or not he may have resettled in that other
country. Id. The INS will not grant asylum where the alien has firmly resettled in a third place.

Id.
74. Id. at 18 n.4. The Board began considering asylum claims on May 19, 1979. The Board
decided Lam on March 24, 1981. Id. at 15.
75. 18 I & N Dec. 311 (B.I.A. 1982).
76. Id. at 312.
77. Id. at 317. The Board ordered that if the government of Pakistan refused to accept
the alien's deportation to that country, then the deportation would be temporarily withheld
under § 243(h). Id.
78. Id. at 314.
79. No. 2986, slip op. (B.I.A. Mar. 1, 1985).
80. Id. at 4. The immigration judge granted the alien the privilege of departing voluntarily in lieu of deportation. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 25.
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judges consider section 243(h) and 208 requests simultaneously."3
These judges face a difficult task when assessing an alien's claim
under one standard. 4 Two different standards make assessing claims
even more burdensome; therefore, judges may encounter difficulty
distinguishing the two standards. In dicta, the Board stated that immigration judges engage in a qualitative rather than quantitative
analysis when assessing the likelihood of persecution.8
Immigration judges examine the alien's experiences and other external events to determine whether he will be subject to persecution. 6 Under Acosta, the alien must demonstrate that he possesses a
characteristic which persecutors seek to punish. 7 Furthermore, the
alien must show that (1) persecutors can easily discover this characteristic, and (2) the persecutors possess the ability to punish the
alien.88 The Acosta Board concluded that when judges conduct this
inquiry, the standards under sections 208 and 243(h) did not meaningfully differ.8 9
The Board's conclusion that the standards did not differ appears
to conflict with both the statutory language and legislative history.
The language in sections 243(h) and 208 differs significantly.9 0 Also,
the legislative history demonstrates an intent to provide asylum procedures separate from withholding of deportation.9 1 In the INA, Congress amended section 243(h) to make it conform more closely with
Article 33 of the Protocol. 2 Also, Congress apparently enacted section 208 asylum to satisfy Article 34 of the Protocol.93 Although in
the Protocol both Articles 33 and 34 refer to the refugee definition,
Congress only incorporated that definition into section 208, not sec83. This occurs under 8 C.F.R. § 208.3(2)(b) (1986). For an explanation of this provision,
see supra note 5.
84. To aid in this process, the Code of Federal Regulations provides that all immigration
judges must request a State Department advisory opinion before deciding an asylum claim. 8
C.F.R. § 208.10(b) (1986).
85. Acosta, No. 2986, slip op. at 25.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 22. See generally Note, The Right to Asylum Under United States Law, 80
COLuM. L. REv. 1125 (1980) (examines the conditions under which asylum can be granted including inter alia the kind and degree of harm threatened, as well as the likelihood the harm
will occur).
88. Acosta, No. 2986, slip op. at 22.
89. Id. at 25.
90. RA, Pub. L. No. 96-212, §§ 208(a), 203(e), 94 Stat. 102, 107 (1980) (codified at 8
U.S.C. § 1253(h) (1985) (section 243(h) does not include the well-founded fear language referred to in section 208).
91. See supra notes 57-59 and accompanying text.
92.' H.R. REP. No. 608, supra note 19, at 18.
93. Article 34 of the Protocol relates to the assimilation of refugees, while Article 33 relates to the prohibition of expulsion or return of a refugee. Supra note 3.
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tion 243(h)."4
The Justice Department, not Congress, promulgated the regulations requiring immigration judges to evaluate both claims simultaneously.9 5 These regulations cause assessment problems, and blur distinctions between sections 208 and 243(h).9 Logic dictates that an
alien should carry a heavier burden of proof for an entitlement to
relief than for a discretionary form of relief.9 7 Therefore, under the
existing INA, the alien should have a heavier burden of proof to
qualify for a section 243(h) entitlement than for section 208 discretionary asylum. The INS has failed to make this distinction. 8
2.

The Third Circuit

Like the INS, the Third Circuit has equated section 208's wellfounded fear standard with section 243(h)'s clear probability of persecution standard.9 In effect, the Third Circuit adopted a one-standard approach to asylum and withholding of deportation claims. The
Third Circuit first employed this approach in 1982.
In Rejaie v. INS, 0 0 the petitioner-alien filed for asylum after the
Board ordered him to report for deportation. 101 The petitioner filed
for asylum under the Code of Federal Regulations' 0 2 rather than
under section 208 statutory asylum. 0 3 After the Board denied petitioner's request he appealed, contending the Board applied an incorrect standard when considering his fear of Iranian persecution.10 " The
petitioner argued that the well-founded fear language included in the
definition of refugee changed the standard for asylum under the
Code of Federal Regulations.' 05 The petitioner further asserted that
the Board should have applied the more lenient well-founded fear of
persecution standard, instead of the clear probability standard in
94. RA, Pub. L. No. 96-212, § 203(e), 94 Stat. 102, 107 (1980) (codified in 8 U.S.C. §
1253(h) (1985)). The omission does not seem accidental because Congress omitted the word
refugee throughout its discussion of § 243(h). H.R. REP. No. 608, supra note 19, at 18.
95. 8 C.F.R. § 208.3(2)(b) (1986).
96. Acosta, No. 2986, slip op. at 25.
97. See Carvajal-Munoz v. INS, 743 F.2d 562 (7th Cir. 1984) (court advanced this reasoning as a justification for the two-standard approach).
98. See supra notes 79-89 and accompanying text.
99. See, e.g., Sankar v. INS, 757 F.2d 532, 533 (3d Cir. 1985) (court equates §§ 208 and
243(h) standards).
100. 691 F.2d 139 (3d Cir. 1982).
101. Id. at 141.
102. The Justice Department repealed 8 C.F.R. § 108.3(b) on January 1, 1982. Section 108
asylum had existed in the INS regulations since before the enactment of statutory asylum. See
supra note 41 for a discussion of 8 C.F.R. § 108 (1981).
103. Rejaie, 691 F.2d at 141.
104. Id. at 142.
105. Id. at 142-44.
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considering his asylum request.01
The court rejected the petitioner's argument.10 7 Instead, it held
that the Board's burden of proof formulation remained unchanged
whether labeled clear probability or well-founded fear of persecution.10 8 The court opined that Congress adopted the well-founded
fear of persecution language solely for the sake of clarity, so that the
INA would conform more closely with the language of the
Convention.109
An analysis of the legislative history reveals that although Congress made an effort to conform the INA to the language of the Convention,1 10 important differences between these two Acts remained.
Article 1(A)(2) of the Convention defines a refugee as an alien harboring a well-founded fear of persecution."' The Convention also
contains a refoulement provision in Article 33 which prohibits expelling refugees whose lives or freedom would be threatened on account
of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group,
or political opinion.1 12 Congress amended section 243(h) so that its
language would conform more closely with Article 33 of the Convention.11 3 However, Congress did not adopt the term "refugee" as used
in Article 33, but chose to keep the word "alien."' 1 4 By omitting the
word refugee, Congress implicitly rejected the well-founded fear of
5
persecution standard in section 243(h) of the INA."
In contrast, section 208 of the INA specifically limited asylum to
those aliens who qualified as refugees. "' In 1980 Congress added paragraph 42 to section 101(a) of the INA which contained the same
106. Id. at 146.
107. Id. at 142-44.
108. Id. at 146.
109. Id. at 144. The court cited a congressional report supporting its view. "Although this
section has been held by court and administrative decisions to accord to aliens the protection
required under Article 33, the committee feels it desirable, for the sake of clarity, to conform
the language of that section to the convention." Id. at 145 (citing H.R. No. 608, supra note 19).
110. See, e.g., H.R. No. 608, supra note 19, at 18 (The report stated that Congress added
the new definition of "refugee" and amended section 243(h) to conform more closely with the
Convention and Protocol).
111. Convention, supra note 3, art. 1(A)(2).
112. Id. art. 33.
113. H.R. No. 608, supra note 19, at 18.
114. Compare INA, Pub. L. No. 96-212, § 203(e), 94 Stat. 102, 107 (1980) (codified at 8
U.S.C. § 1253(h) (1986) (the current withholding of deportation provision) with INA, Pub. L.
No. 82-414, § 243(h), 66 Stat. 163, 214 (1952) (the version of § 243(h) which preceded the 1980
amendments to the INA) and Convention, supra note 3, art. 33 (the refoulement provision, the
equivalent of withholding of deportation, applied to "refugees," rather than "aliens").
115. Stevic, 104 S.Ct. at 2498.
116. INA, Pub. L. No. 96-212, § 208(a), 94 Stat. 102, 105 (1980) (codified at 8 U.S.C. §
1158(a) (1986)). See also H.R. No. 608, supra note 19, at 17 (legislative history of § 208 of the
INA supports the view that Congress limited asylum to aliens which qualified as refugees).
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refugee definition used in Article l(A)(2) of the Convention. " " Rejaie
noted that, like the adoption of the new definition of a refugee, the
modification of section 243(h) was effected so its language would conform more closely with the Convention's language. 18 However, by
omitting the term refugee in section 243(h) and including it in section 208, Congress limited the well-founded fear of persecution standard to section 208 asylum cases." 9 At no time did the legislative
history indicate that the clear20 probability and well-founded fear standards were interchangeable.

Rejaie held the standards were interchangeable before the Supreme Court had held that an alien must establish a a clear
probability of persecution to avoid deportation under section
243(h).' 2 1 Also, although the Rejaie court cited legislative history per-

taining to section 208 asylum, the case itself concerned a request for
asylum under the 1981 Code of Federal Regulations.1 22 These factors
may explain Rejaie's seeming inconsistency with both congressional
intent, and the dicta in Stevic which assumed the well-founded fear
standard was more generous than the clear probability of persecution
standard. 2 '
A subsequent Third Circuit case also preceding Stevic applied the
Rejaie holding. In Marroquin-Manriquez v. INS, 24 the petitioneralien filed for both section 243(h) witholding of deportation and political asylum. 2 The petitioner argued that the Board erroneously
applied the clear probability of persecution26 standard instead of the
well-founded fear standard to his request.

The Marroquin court held the Board correctly applied the clear
probability of persecution standard to the petitioner's claim. 127 The
117. Pub. L. 96-212, § 201(a), 94 Stat. 102, 105 (1980). Compare Convention, supra note
3, art. 1(A)(2).
118. Rejaie, 691 F.2d at 144. See also H.R. No. 608, supra note 19, at 9, 18 (explicitly
affirms the cited proposition).
119. Stevic, 104 S.Ct. at 2498.
120. See H.R. No. 608, supra note 19; H.R. 7700 Hearings, supra note 25; SENATE COMM.
REPORT, supra note 25.
121. Rejaie, 691 F.2d at 146 (Rejaie was decided on Oct. 13, 1982, while Stevic was de-

cided on June 5, 1984).
122. Id. at 141, 144 n.2.
123. Stevic, 104 S. Ct. at 2498.
124. 699 F.2d 129 (1983).
125. Id. at 131.
126. Id. at 133. Petitioner relied on recent amendments requiring application of wellfounded fear standard. Id. See Stevic v. Sava, 678 F.2d 401 (2d Cir. 1982), rev'd sub nom., INS
v. Stevic, 104 S. Ct. 2489 (1984).
127. Marroquin, 699 F.2d at 133. The court would not disturb the Board of Immigration
Appeals' exercise of discretion unless arbitrary, irrational or contrary to law. Id. See So Chun
Chung v. INS, 602 F.2d 608, 612 (3d Cir. 1979) (stands for the proposition that only arbitrary
Board decisions should be overturned).
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opinion refers to petitioner's claim as both a claim for asylum filed
before deportation proceedings commenced and a request for withholding of deportation.12 8 As in Rejaie, the alien brought his asylum
claim under the Code of Federal Regulations because, at the time of
petitioner's asylum request, Congress had not yet enacted section
208.29 Thus, courts relying on Marroquinand Rejaie as precedent in
section 208 cases expand the holdings because neither case involved
statutory asylum under section 208 and both cases preceded
Stevic."30
A 1984 Third Circuit case expanded the Rejaie and Marroquin
holdings in this manner. In Sotto v. INS,"' the petitioner-alien requested section 208 asylum after deportation proceedings were commenced. 32 Following INS regulations' 3 3 the immigration judge automatically considered the petition as a request for both asylum and
withholding of deportation. 3 4 The immigration judge considered
both claims under one standard, equating well-founded fear of persecution with clear probability of persecution. 3 5 Although the Sotto
petitioner did not raise the issue of the proper burden of proof, the
court discussed it in dicta."' Citing Rejaie, the Third Circuit reasoned that, because immigration courts frequently joined section
243(h) and section 208 requests, they should evaluate both requests
under a congruent standard. 37 The court also stated that nothing in
128. Marroquin, 699 F.2d at 131. If the petitioner had filed a § 208 request for asylum
after deportation proceedings had already commenced, then the court would have considered
the request for asylum a request for § 243(h) withholding of deportation also. However, in the
instant case, the petitioner filed the request for asylum before deportation proceedings began.
Id. at 133. The instant case never makes clear why it evaluated the petitioner's claim for asylum as a § 243(h) request for withholding of deportation. Id.
129. Id. The INS district director denied the petitioner's request for asylum (and withholding of deportation) on December 21, 1978. Id. Statutory asylum under § 208 of the INA did
not become effective until March 17, 1980. 8 U.S.C. § 1158 (1986). Thus, the petitioner's request for asylum in Marroquin seems to have been governed by 8 C.F.R. § 10 (1978).
130. The Third Circuit Court of Appeals decided Rejaie on October 1, 1982, and Marroquin on January 27, 1983. Rejaie, 691 F. 2d at 139; Marroquin, 699 F.2d at 129. The Supreme
Court rendered the Stevic decision on June 5, 1984. Rejaie dealt with asylum under 8 C.F.R. §
108 (1981). Rejaie, 691 F.2d at 144 n.2. In Marroquin, the State Department denied the petitioner asylum on December 21, 1978. Marroquin,699 F.2d 129, 130. Thus, Marroquin also appears to have dealt with asylum under the Code of Federal Regulations. See supra note 41 (for
discussion of 8 C.F.R. § 108 (1981)).
131. 748 F.2d 832 (3d Cir. 1984).
132. Id. at 833-34.
133. 8 C.F.R. § 208.3(b) (1984).
134. Sotto, 748 F.2d at 834.
135. Id. at 835-36. See 8 C.F.R. §§ 208.1(b), 236.3(a) (1984).
136. Sotto, 748 F.2d at 836.
137. Id. See Rejaie, 691 F.2d 139 (1982) (stands for the proposition that there is no difference between the "well-founded fear" standard and the "clear probability" standard).
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Stevic undermined the Rejaie holding.138 Thus, the Third Circuit endorsed the one-standard approach for section 208 and section 243(h)
before the issue had presented itself on appeal."3 9
In 1985 the section 208 burden of proof issue did arise on appeal.
In Sankar v. INS,' ° petitioner-alien contended the Board had incorrectly evaluated his application for section 208 asylum under the
clear probability rather than the well-founded fear of persecution
standard."" Although the Third Circuit was entertaining the section
208 burden of proof issue for the first time, it summarily concluded
the two standards did not differ.' 42
The Sankar court cited Rejaie, Marroquin, and Sotto to support
its holding. 43 None of the cases cited, however, involved section 208
asylum. " ' Furthermore, Sankar did not examine legislative history
or the policy reasons behind the asylum provision." 5 As a practical
matter, immigration judges may prefer the one-standard approach. 4 '
Nevertheless, Sankar's judicially active approach spurns the congressional intent behind the asylum provision.
B.

The Two-Standard Approach

1. The Sixth and Seventh Circuits
Both the Sixth and Seventh Circuits have followed legislative intent more closely by applying different standards to section 208 asylum and section 243(h) withholding of deportation. In CarvajalMunoz v. INS, 14 7 the immigration judge denied the alien's request for

asylum and withholding of deportation. 4 8 On appeal, the Seventh
Circuit held the alien had not met his burden of proof under either
request. 4 9 The court stated, however, that the immigration judge

138. Sotto, 748 F. 2d at 836.
139. Id.
140. 757 F.2d 532 (3d Cir. 1985).
141. Id. at 532.
142. Id. at 533.
143. Id. See Sotto v. INS, 748 F.2d 832 (3d Cir. 1984) (holding that the standards of proof
for "well-founded fear" and "clear probability" do not differ); Marroquin-Manriquez v. INS,
699 F.2d 129 (3d Cir. 1983) (same); Rejaie v. INS, 691 F.2d 139 (3d Cir. 1982) (same).
144. See supra notes 100-39 and accompanying text. See also infra note 148 and accompanying text.
145. Sankar, 757 F.2d at 532-33.
146. See supra notes 83-85 and accompanying text.
147. 743 F.2d 562 (7th Cir. 1984).
148. Id. at 563. The immigration judge concluded that the petitioner demonstrated no
clear probability that his life or freedom would be threatened if sent to Chile or Argentina. Id.
Cf. Marroquin,699 F.2d at 132 (immigration judge stated petitioner failed to establish that his
life would be endangered upon return to Mexico).
149. Carvajal,743 F.2d at 564.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1986

15

Florida
Journal ofINTERNATIONAL
International Law, Vol.
2, Iss.
2 [1986], Art. 4
FLORIDA
LAW
JOURNAL

[Vol. II

should have employed a less stringent standard for asylum than for
withholding of deportation.15 6 Instead of remanding the case, the
Carvajal court conducted its own analysis under the two
standards."'1
The court carefully distinguished the two provisions. 52 It stated
that clear probability and well-founded fear had very similar but not
identical meanings." 3 The Seventh Circuit reasoned that because
section 243(h) established an entitlement to withholding of deportation it also required a greater evidentiary burden than discretionary
relief under section 208.15" The Third Circuit's one-standard approach ignores this factor, as well as the legislative history carefully
examined in Carvajal.
The Carvajal court blamed the burden of proof confusion on Justice Department rules requiring an immigration judge to consider
section 208 and 243(h) requests together. 155 The court felt immigration judges should consider asylum decisions on a separate record
and before the deportation hearing itself.1 56 This approach makes
more sense because the content and focus of each section's hearing
differs.' 5 7 For example, regulations grant asylum applicants a greater
degree of due process than section 243(h) applicants. Immigration
judges must await a State Department advisory opinion before rendering an asylum decision.' 8 Section 243(h) has no similar require150. Id. at 571-75. The immigration judge held that, to meet the withholding of deportation burden of proof, petitioner must show clear probability that he will be persecuted if returned to his country. Id. at 571. To qualify for asylum, an alien must show he would be persecuted for the reasons mentioned in § 243(h). Id.
151. Id. at 575-80. The court specifically addressed at the outset the issue of whether
courts possessed power to review the Board decision. Id. at 566. The court concluded that § 106
of the INA permitted direct review. Id. See Fleurinor v. INS, 585 F.2d 129, 135-36 (5th Cir.
1978) (support for the proposition that INA, § 106 permits judicial review of immigration
judges' and the Board of Immigration Appeal's decisions).
152. Carvajal, 743 F.2d at 564.
153. Id. at 574-75. But cf. Sotto v. INS, 748 F.2d 832 (3d Cir. 1984) (stands for the proposition that the evidentiary burden under § 243(h) is the same whether the standard is wellfounded fear or clear probability of persecution); Marroquin-Manriquez v. INS, 699 F.2d 129
(3d Cir. 1983) (same); Rejaie v. INS, 691 F.2d 139 (3d Cir. 1982) (same).
154. Carvajal,743 F.2d at 575. See Kashani v. INS, 547 F.2d 376 (7th Cir. 1977) (under
clear probability standard, objective evidence is.
necessary, at a minimum an applicant has to
provide specific facts regarding his conduct and contentions).
155. Carvajal,743 F.2d at 569.
156. Id. at 570.
157. Id. at 569. See Augustin v. Sava, 735 F.2d 32, 37 (2d Cir. 1984) (the degree and force
of due process differs in the case of a discretionary grant of asylum from the case of deportation
based on clear probability). See generally Scanlan, Asylum Adjudication: Some Due Process
Implications of Proposed Immigration Legislation, 44 U. PIrr. L. REV. 261 (1983) (article analyzed the due process implications of amendments to the Refugee Act of 1980).
158. Carvajal,743 F.2d at 570. See 8 C.F.R. § 208.10 (1984) (judge must await an advisory opinion from State Department).
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ment. 15 Even if efficiency makes Carvajal'sseparate hearing suggestion impracticable, immigration judges should decide section 243(h)
and section 208 claims separately. 60
The Sixth Circuit has followed Carvajal's reasoning. In
Youkhanna v. INS,' 61 the petitioner-alien appealed a Board decision
denying him relief under sections 208 and 243(h).112 The court stated
that the section 208 well-founded fear standard required less evidence of persecution than the section 243(h) clear probability standard."8 3 The court held, however, that the alien had failed to meet
even the more generous well-founded fear standard's burden of
proof. 164 Like the Seventh Circuit, the Youkhanna court conducted
its own analysis inquiry, rather than remanding the case.' 65 The court
did not reject the alien's testimony, it simply ruled that the evidence
did not meet either the 208 or the 243(h) standards."66 Thus, both
the Sixth and Seventh Circuits have held the well-founded fear standard constitutes a more generous standard than clear probability of
persecution.
2. The Ninth Circuit
The Ninth Circuit has adopted the strongest position in favor of
the two-standard approach. In Cardoza-Fonsecav. INS,167 two aliens
petitioned a decision denying them section 1158(a) asylum. 6 8 The
petitioners asserted that the immigration judge had erroneously applied section 243(h)'s clear probability standard when evaluating
their section 208 claim. 69 The court reversed and remanded the
Board's decision, with instructions to evaluate the petitioner's claim
under the less stringent well-founded fear standard."
159. Carvajal, 743 F.2d at 570. See 8 C.F.R. § 242.17(c) (1984) (immigration judge may
conduct withholding of deportation hearing without benefit of a State Department advisory
opinion).
160. Carvajal, 743 F.2d at 570.
161. 749 F.2d 360 (6th Cir. 1984).
162. Id. at 361. The petitioners applied for withholding of deportation and for asylum. Id.
The applications were denied on the basis that the petitioners failed to establish a well-founded
fear of persecution upon return to Iraq. Id.
163. Id. at 362.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 361.
166. Id. at 362.
167. 767 F.2d 1448 (9th Cir. 1985).
168. Id. at 1450. For the text of § 1158, see supra note 1.
169. 767 F.2d at 1450. See generally Note, Eligibility for Withholding of Deportation:
The Alien's Burden Under the 1980 Refugee Act, 49 BROOKLYN L. REV. 1193 (1983) (for a
discussion of the Refugee Act and the burdens of proof necessary for withholding of deportation and political asylum).
170. Cardoza, 767 F.2d at 1455.
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The Cardoza court stated that the well-founded fear standard
contained a subjective element not present in the clear probability
standard.17 1 The court also stated that the clear probability standard
required the applicant to demonstrate a greater than fifty percent
chance of persecution. 17 2 In contrast, the well-founded fear standard
required that (1) the alien possess a subjective fear of persecution
and (2) the fear have a well-founded basis. 7 3 This position partially
contradicts the Board's view that the immigration judge engages in a
qualitative rather than quantitative analysis for both clear
probability and well-founded fear of persecution claims.17 However,
in adhering to the one-standard approach, despite the Sixth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits' holdings to the contrary, the Board ignored
the principles of judicial review.1 75 Cardoza pointed this out, and
held the well-founded fear standard is unequivocally more generous
76
than the clear probability of persecution standard.1
Previous Ninth Circuit cases have consistently held that the wellfounded fear standard constitutes a more generous standard than
clear probability of persecution. For example, in Bolanos-Hernandez
v. the INS,17 7 the petitioner appealed a decision denying his requests
for section 208 asylum and section 243(h) withholding of deportation.17 8 The court reversed the Board's decision and found
the peti79
tioner had met the burden of proof for both sections.
Bolanos further held that well-founded fear constituted a less
stringent standard than clear probability of persecution. 180 Bolanos
relied on the differences in the statutory language, the legislative history, and the language in Stevic' 8 ' to support its conclusion.182 In
Stevic, the Supreme Court did not decide the meaning of the phrase
"well-founded fear," but assumed, for purposes of the case, that the
well-founded fear language represented a more generous standard
than clear probability.'83 The Bolanos court adopted this view. 8
171. Id. at 1452.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 1453.
174. See Acosta, No. 2986, slip op. at 25 (states that Board engages in qualitative
analysis).
175. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch.) 137 (1803) (landmark case defining the
scope of judicial review).
176. Cardoza, 767 F.2d at 1454.
177. 749 F.2d 1316 (9th Cir. 1984).
178. Id. at 1318.
179. Id. at 1326.
180. Id. at 1321.
181. See Stevic, 104 S. Ct. 2489.
182. Bolanos, 749 F.2d at 1321 n.10.
183. Id. at 1321. The court points out that no case has defined "well-founded fear" other
than to state that it should be based in part on the applicant's state of mind. Id. at 1321 n.11.
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Bolanos suggested that, when presented with both section 208
and section 243(h) requests, the immigration judge should evaluate
the section 243(h) request first. 85 Then, if the judge denied the section 243(h) request, he should consider the section 208 claim under
the more generous well-founded fear standard."" If, however, the
judge approved the section 243(h) request, then a fortiorarithe alien
would also have met the well-founded fear standard.1 8 7
The Bolanos solution has some appeal, but it fails to consider the
different content and focus of each section's hearings. The Seventh
Circuit solution, in which the judges decide each request on separate
records, keeps the two processes distinct. 8' No matter which solution
a judge employs, he should at least set forth his decision on the two
claims separately. This would comport with Congress' intent to offer
an asylum provision separate from withholding of deportation.1 89

IV.

PROPOSED SOLUTIONS

The Supreme Court has granted certiorari 90 in Cardoza' 91 and
should adopt the two-standard approach, thereby aligning the Third
Circuit with the Sixth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits which employ the
two-standard approach. Bolanos and Carvajaldemonstrate that even
in circuits employing the two-standard approach, disagreement exists
on how to apply it." The Court should provide clear guidelines on
how the immigration courts should handle the problem. Perhaps the
best approach consists of a hybrid between the proposed Seventh and
Ninth Circuit's solutions.
The immigration judge should decide section 243(h) claims first
because the section carries (1) the more stringent burden of proof
and (2) the less extensive inquiry process. 93 If the judge approves the
section 243(h) claim, then the alien has satisfied the less stringent
section 208 burden of proof.19 4 If the judge denies the section 243(h)
See generally Developments in the Law - Immigration Policy and the Rights of Aliens, 96
HARV. L. REv. 1286, 1355 (1983) (delineates the concept of state of mind or subjective demeanor
of aliens as a factor in well-founded fear).
184. Bolanos, 749 F.2d at 1321.
185. Id. at 1322.
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. See Carvajal, 743 F.2d 562.
189. See supra notes 57-58, 91-94 & 110-20 and accompanying text.
190. 106 S. Ct. 1181 (1986).
191. 767 F.2d 1448 (3d Cir. 1985).
192. See Bolanos, 749 F.2d at 1322, and Carvajal, 743 F.2d at 570, which implement the
two-standard approach differently.
193. Bolanos, 749 F.2d at 1322.
194. Id.
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request, then the court should proceed with more extensive inquiry
and evaluate the alien's asylum claim under the more lenient wellfounded fear standard. No matter what the result, the immigration
judge should set forth his decision for each claim separately to insure
separate consideration both at the trial court level and on appeal.
However, even if the decisions are set forth separately, the hybrid
solution may cause problems for the alien on appeal. For example, a
trial court may decide in favor of the alien on the stricter 243(h)
standard, and therefore automatically approve the section 208 request. If the appellate court reverses the section 243(h) claim, then
section 208 asylum would also be denied, unless the appellate court
remanded the section 208 issue. A remand would defeat the efficiency
rationale for evaluating both claims together in the first place.
Congress could reject the efficiency rationale, and ensure that
courts consider sections 243(h) and 208 separately by amending the
INA to explicitly require it. Also, Congress could define or provide
more specific guidelines for the phrases "clear probability" and "wellfounded fear."19 5 For example, clear probability could require a
greater than fifty percent chance of persecution based on specific, objective evidence. 196 Congress could define well-founded fear to require
that (1) the alien possess a subjective fear of persecution and (2) the
fear have a well-founded basis.1 9 7 The amended statute could further
require immigration judges to employ the reasonable man standard
in making all determinations. Additionally, the INA could explicitly
state that the well-founded fear standard constitutes a more generous
standard than clear probability of persecution.
Congress, however, cannot anticipate every factual situation arising under the INA. The standards must contain some flexibility so
that courts may adopt them to the various factual situations which
arise. Although the present statutory language may lack some specificity, it reads quite clearly. Congress did not cause the confusion between sections 208 and 243(h).
The greatest blame for the confusion in interpretation and perhaps the simplest solution lies with the Justice Department. 9 8 Under
Justice Department regulations, an immigration judge must consider
a request for asylum filed after commencement of deportation pro195. Currently, the INA does not define either term. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1253(h), 1158(a) (1985).
196. See supra notes 171-73 and accompanying text (Seventh Circuit has defined the
terms in this manner).
197. Id.
198. The Justice Department promulgated the rules which require immigration judges to
consider §§ 208 and 243(h) together. See supra note 5 and accompanying text for a discussion
of the regulation.
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ceedings as a simultaneous request for withholding of deportation. 199
The regulations force the immigration judge to consider both requests together. The Department could easily amend the regulations
to require that the judge separately consider the requests. This separate consideration solution may increase court costs by increasing the
time required to evaluate the requests. It may also lead to duplicative
fact finding. Nonetheless, a Justice Department approach to the
problem enjoys the greatest appeal because of the ease and speed of
implementation."' 0 The 1987 Code of Federal Regulations could help
resolve the asylum problem by eliminating joint consideration of section 243(h) and section 208 claims.
V.

CONCLUSION

The asylum concept traces its roots to the philosophies underlying
the foundations of our country. 0 1 Congress has carefully crafted an
asylum provision distinct from withholding of deportation and consistent with international law.20 2 Both the INS and the Third Circuit
have undermined this legislation by evaluating asylum requests
under the withholding of deportation burden of proof. 203 The Sixth,
Seventh, and Ninth Circuits correctly evaluated section 243(h) requests under a clear probability standard and asylum requests under
the more lenient well-founded fear standard.20 ' Legislative intent
supports this two-standard approach.2 0 5
The Supreme Court should adopt the two-standard approach in
Cardoza, thus aligning the Third Circuit and the INS with congressional intent. Alternatively, Congress or the Justice Department
could respond with amendments clarifying asylum procedures and
ensuring a separate evaluation of asylum and withholding of deportation requests.2 0 6 These governmental bodies should quell the Third
199. Id.
200. The regulations are renewed annually.
201. See supra note 11 and accompanying text (even until 1917, the idea that the United
States had a duty to provide refuge for persecuted aliens kept immigration relatively
unencumbered).
202. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1158, 1253(h) (1985). See supra notes 33-38 and accompanying text (the
language now conforms closely with the language of the Protocol).
203. See supra notes 140-46 and accompanying text (explicitly reaffirm the cited
proposition).
204. See supra notes 147-89 and accompanying text (explicitly reaffirm the cited
proposition).
205. See supra notes 57-58, 91-94 & 110-20 and accompanying text (explicitly reaffirm the
cited proposition).
206. Recently Attorney General Edwin Meese stated that restructuring the asylum provisions in the Code of Federal Regulations was currently at the top of the Justice Department's
priorities. Address by Attorney General Edwin Meese to the National Press Club (recorded
Feb. 25, 1986, broadcast on all National Public Radio and Cable stations on Mar. 3, 1986, at
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Circuit's judicial activist one-standard approach which spurns congressional intent and hampers refugees seeking asylum.

VI.

EPILOGUE

While this note was at press, the United States Supreme Court
2 0 7 Consistent
decided INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca.
with this note's proposals and the Ninth Circuit's holdings, the Court decided that the
well-founded fear of persecution standard applicable to section 208
asylum requests constituted a more lenient standard than the section
243(h) clear probability of persecution standard.2 0° The Court further
stated that section 208 contemplated a partially subjective inquiry,
while section 243(h) required the alien to establish by evidence that
it is more likely than not that he or she will be persecuted.20 9
The Court stated that its holding was consistent with congressional intent and the Protocol.21 0 The government argued it would be
anomalous for section 208, which affords greater benefits than section
243(h), to have a less stringent standard of eligibility. Rejecting the
argument, the Court noted that under section 208 qualifying refugees
become eligible for discretionary asylum, while aliens qualifying
under section 243(h) become automatically entitled to withholding of
deportation.2 ' The Court also concluded that it could overrule the
Board of Immigration Appeals' interpretation of the INA because the
issue presented a pure question of statutory construction for the
courts to decide.21 2
Two Justices concurred, and three dissented. The dissent stated
inter alia that the majority failed to identify an error in the decision
of the instant case.2 13 The dissent concluded that 'the majority had
misconstrued the INA and misread the legislative history.21 4
STEVEN

12:15 p.m. EST).
207. 55 U.S.L.W. 4313 (U.S. Mar. 10, 1987).
208. Id. at 4321.
209. Id. at 4316.
210. Id. at 4316-19.
211. Id. at 4319.
212. Id. at 4319-20.
213. Id. at 4326.
214. Id.
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